Xref: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu sci.crypt:15516 comp.org.eff.talk:17006
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk
Path: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!crabapple.srv.cs.cmu.edu!bb3.andrew.cmu.edu!news.sei.cmu.edu!cis.ohio-state.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!math.fu-berlin.de!ifmsun8.ifm.uni-hamburg.de!rzsun2.informatik.uni-hamburg.de!fbihh!bontchev
From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: Clipper considered harmful
Message-ID: <bontchev.735336144@fbihh>
Sender: news@informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Mr. News)
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
References: <15469@optilink.COM>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1993 20:02:24 GMT
Lines: 37

brad@optilink.COM (Brad Yearwood) writes:

> Criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications (specificall
> the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow cite as threats)
> will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of a legitimate user, and
> to kill this person or hold them hostage so discovery of compromise of the
> device will be delayed.

Why doing it in such a rough manner? It is much more professional to
steal the chip from the phone and even to replace it with a
pin-compatible do-nothing chip that does not encrypt at all. Chances
are that the victim will not notice anything, especially if it is done
professionally.

> Once a suitable collection of devices is stolen, criminals can communicate
> with impunity (assuming the cipher system carries no trapdoors apart from
> key escrow) until and unless the compromise is discovered by some other means.

No, because the Feds will still be able to decrypt the conversations.
True, they'll blame the wrong guys, but nevertheless one cannot say
something like "The drugs arrive tommorrow on the ship 'Terminus'"
when the Feds are listening, even if they cannot identify who the
speaker is.

No, the criminals will just use some secure encryption. The new
proposal does not stop criminals; it ensures that the government will
be able to wiretap the average citizen and stops the casual snooper.
To me, it also clearly looks as a step towards outlawing any other
strong encryption devices.

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.2 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
