

Proof of the Minimax Theorem

September 9, 2002

The proof of the minimax theorem follows the format given in Luce and Raiffa [1], but has been modified to use our class terminology.

Formalisms

We first characterize a two-person, zero-sum game.

1. There are two players, P1 and P2.
2. P1 has a set $A = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m\}$ of m pure strategies (actions).
3. P2 has a set $B = \{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n\}$ of n pure strategies (actions).
4. Each player has a utility for each (a_i, b_j) pair of actions. The utility for P1 is denoted $U_1(a_i, b_j)$ and the utility for P2 is denoted $U_2(a_i, b_j)$. Since this is a zero-sum game, $U_1(a_i, b_j) = -U_2(a_i, b_j)$ for all i and j . To minimize the number of subscripts we will carry around, let $M(a_i, b_j) = U_1(a_i, b_j)$ denote the *mutual* utility for the game.
5. Each player can use a mixed strategy by creating a probability mass function and playing each pure strategy with a fixed probability. Let p_i denote the probability that player 1 will play action a_i , and let q_j denote the probability that player 2 will play action b_j . Since p and q are probabilities, they must satisfy

$$(a) \forall i \ p_i \geq 0, \forall j \ q_j \geq 0 .$$

$$(b) \sum_{i=1}^m p_i = 1, \sum_{j=1}^n q_j = 1.$$

A mixed strategy that uses a particular probability mass function is denoted $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m)$ where $p_i = Pr(a_i)$ is the probability that action a_i will be played; similarly, for player 2 $\mathbf{q} = (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n)$.

6. For each randomized strategy pair (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) , the payoff $M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})$ is defined to be

$$M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n p_i M(a_i, b_j) q_j.$$

We denote the payoff when player 1 uses pure strategy a_i and player 2 uses mixed strategy \mathbf{q} as

$$M(a_i, \mathbf{q}) = \sum_{j=1}^n M(a_i, b_j)q_j$$

with similar notation for $M(\mathbf{p}, b_j)$.

7. In much the same way that A and B denote the set of *pure* strategies available to player 1 and 2, respectively, we use P and Q to denote the set of all *mixed* strategies available to player 1 and 2, respectively.
8. Player 1's objective is to select a randomized strategy \mathbf{p} from P so as to maximize $M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})$. At the same time, player 2's objective is to select a randomized strategy \mathbf{q} from Q so as to maximize its payoff, which is equivalent to minimizing $M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})$. The rules of the game require that each player choose its strategy in complete ignorance of the opponent's selection.
9. For each mixed strategy \mathbf{p} belonging to P , player 1's security level is defined to be

$$v_1(\mathbf{p}) = \min_{\mathbf{q}} M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}).$$

Since

$$M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = \sum_{j=1}^n M(\mathbf{p}, b_j)q_j$$

is a weighted sum of the n payoffs $M(\mathbf{p}, b_j)$, it is minimized when all of the weight is assigned to the least of these (do you see why? look at how we compute the maximin mixed strategy in the lecture notes.)

$$v_1(\mathbf{p}) = \min[M(\mathbf{p}, b_1), M(\mathbf{p}, b_2), \dots, M(\mathbf{p}, b_n)].$$

You can think of $v_1(\mathbf{p})$ as the payoff that player 1 will receive if player 2 knows that P1 will do \mathbf{p} . (Why? Because if player 2 knows this, then it can choose its best response.) We can define $v_2(\mathbf{q})$ for player 2 in a similar way (but using maximums instead of minimums since high M means low payoff to player 2).

10. By assumption, player 1 wants to maximize its security level, so P1 must choose a strategy \mathbf{p}^* such that

$$v_1(\mathbf{p}^*) \geq v_1(\mathbf{p}) \forall \mathbf{p} \in P.$$

Let v_1 denote this maximal security level (i.e., $v_1 = v_1(\mathbf{p}^*)$). Then

$$v_1 = \max_{\mathbf{p}} v_1(\mathbf{p}) \geq v_1(\mathbf{p}) \tag{1}$$

for all other mixed strategies. We also know that

$$v_1 = \min_{\mathbf{q}} M(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}) \leq M(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}) \forall \mathbf{q} \in Q. \tag{2}$$

Inequality (1) means that the strategy that produces v_1 is superior to all other strategies (in terms of maximizing security level). Inequality (2) means that v_1 is the worst (minimum payoff) that player 1 can expect; if player 2 doesn't choose wisely then player 1 will get more than v_1 . The strategy \mathbf{p}^* is called the *maximin* strategy.

11. Because the game is zero-sum, we know that when player 2 maximizes its security level then it minimizes player 1's payoff. If player 2 uses strategy \mathbf{q} , 1 cannot obtain a return greater than

$$v_2(\mathbf{q}) = \max_{\mathbf{p}} M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}).$$

The value v_2 is sometimes called *regret*, which kind of indicates that it is the negation of *security*. Just like player 1 tries to maximize security, player 2 tries to minimize regret. Define

$$\mathbf{q}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbf{q}} v_2(\mathbf{q}),$$

and define

$$v_2 = v_2(\mathbf{q}^*) \leq v_2(\mathbf{q}) \quad \forall \mathbf{q} \in Q. \quad (3)$$

By repeating the analysis that we did for player 1 but with player 2 in mind, we learn that

$$v_2 \geq M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}^*) \quad \forall \mathbf{p} \in P. \quad (4)$$

The strategy \mathbf{q}^* is called the *minimax* strategy.

12. Putting these pieces together, we learn that if player 1 uses the maximin strategy, it is guaranteed at least v_1 units of (security) payoff

$$v_1(\mathbf{p}) \leq v_1 \leq M(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}) \quad \forall \mathbf{q} \in Q.$$

Similarly, if player 2 uses the minimax strategy, it is guaranteed to no more than v_2 units of (regret) loss, which is tantamount to guaranteeing that player 1 can receive no more than v_2 units of payoff

$$M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}^*) \leq v_2 \leq v_2(\mathbf{p}^*) \quad \forall \mathbf{p} \in P.$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}^*) &\leq v_2 \quad \forall \mathbf{p} \in P \\ M(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}^*) &\leq v_2 \\ v_1 &\leq M(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}) \quad \forall \mathbf{q} \in Q \\ v_1 &\leq M(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}^*) \\ v_1 &\leq v_2. \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

13. A pair of strategies $(\mathbf{p}', \mathbf{q}')$ is said to be in equilibrium if \mathbf{p}' is *good against* \mathbf{q}' and vice versa, meaning

$$M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}') \leq M(\mathbf{p}', \mathbf{q}') \leq M(\mathbf{p}', \mathbf{q}).$$

In words, these two strategies are in equilibrium if neither player has an incentive to change (can increase its payoff by unilaterally changing its behavior). To help understand this, it is useful to recall that a Nash equilibrium is a solution pair such that no player has an incentive to unilaterally change his or her action.

Whew! That's quite a bit of information, but its nothing more than a formalism of the concepts we've been talking about informally. Since one of my goals for this course is to help you get confident about reading the literature, I want you to practice putting your thoughts into a concise, mathematical language.

A Useful Theorem

We now turn to an interesting theorem. The theorem states that (a) if an equilibrium exists then the maximin value v_1 equals the minimax value v_2 , (b) if $v_1 = v_2$ then there exists a real number v and a pair of strategies \mathbf{p}^* and \mathbf{q}^* such that the payoffs for these strategies are bounded by v , and (c) if the conditions just mentioned hold then the game has an equilibrium. The theorem does not state that each zero-sum, two-person game satisfies any of these conditions; it only says that if it does then the maximin and minimax solutions are equilibrium solutions. Although we will state the theorem, we will omit the proof of this theorem (it follows almost immediately from our problem specification above) so that we can concentrate on the proof of the minimax theorem. I should point out that many useful theorems have a form similar to this one; they show that several different conditions are equivalent. These theorems are very servicable because they allow us to tie a handful of mixed ideas into an equivalence. The proof of these theorems usually follows a procedure wherein we show that condition 1 implies condition 2, condition 2 implies condition 3, and so on until we can show that condition ℓ implies condition 1.

Theorem 1 *For two-person, zero-sum games as we have presented them, each of the following three conditions implies the other two.*

1. *An equilibrium pair exists.*
- 2.

$$v_1 = \max_{\mathbf{p}} \min_{\mathbf{q}} M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = \min_{\mathbf{q}} \max_{\mathbf{p}} M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = v_2.$$

3. *There exists a real number v , a mixed strategy \mathbf{p}^* , and a mixed strategy \mathbf{q}^* such that*

- (a) $\sum_i M(a_i, b_j) p_i^* \geq v$ for $j = 1, 2, \dots, n$
- (b) $\sum_j M(a_i, b_j) q_j^* \leq v$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$.

Note that condition 3(3a) says that the average loss for player 2 using any pure strategy is no less than v . Similarly, condition 3(3b) says that the average loss for player 1 using any pure strategy is no greater than v .

The Minimax Theorem

Theorem 2 *For every two-person, zero-sum game, there exists an equilibrium strategy.*

Proof: Consider a transformation T that maps mixed strategy pairs (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) into mixed strategy pairs $T(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = (\mathbf{p}', \mathbf{q}')$. What we'll show is that this transformation T has the following two properties:

1. \mathbf{p}^* and \mathbf{q}^* are optimal (i.e., maximin and minimax) strategies if and only if $T(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}^*) = (\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}^*)$. (Any point which is mapped to itself under a transformation is called a *fixed point* of this transformation. For example, consider the transformation $T : \mathfrak{R}^+ \mapsto \mathfrak{R}^+$ defined as $T(x) = x^2$. The value of $x = 1$ is a fixed point since $T(1) = 1^2 = 1$.)
2. T , defined below, has at least one fixed point.

In essence, $c_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})$ represents the improvement to player 1 for switching from strategy \mathbf{p} to strategy a_i . Similarly, $d_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})$ represents the improvement to player 2 for switching from strategy \mathbf{q} to strategy b_j .

We define T as follows. Let

$$c_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = \begin{cases} M(a_i, \mathbf{q}) - M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) & \text{if } M(a_i, \mathbf{q}) - M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$

$$d_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = \begin{cases} M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) - M(\mathbf{p}, b_j) & \text{if } M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) - M(\mathbf{p}, b_j) > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$

Using the notation $T(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = (\mathbf{p}', \mathbf{q}')$, we define

$$p'_i = \frac{p_i + c_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})}$$

$$q'_i = \frac{q_i + d_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^n d_k(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})}.$$

First, we want to show that $T : P \times Q \mapsto P \times Q$ (i.e. that the things produced by the transformations are probabilities), so we need to show that \mathbf{p}' and \mathbf{q}' are probability mass functions. Clearly, since c_i and d_i are both positive then p'_i and q'_i are also both nonnegative. (Recall that probabilities cannot be negative.) The next requirement is that these probabilities sum to one. Since

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^m p'_i &= \sum_{i=1}^m \frac{p_i + c_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})} \\ &= \frac{\sum_{i=1}^m p_i + \sum_{i=1}^m c_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})} \\ &= \frac{1 + \sum_{i=1}^m c_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})} \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

If you look carefully at the statement of the first property of the transformation, you'll see an *if and only if A then B* statement. Most of you remember this, but just in case you don't, the way you establish such a statement is first showing the *if A then B* part and then showing the *if B then A* part. We'll start by showing that if \mathbf{p}^* and \mathbf{q}^* are optimal then $T(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}^*) = (\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}^*)$. Observe that $c_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})$ is a measurement of the amount that a_i is better than \mathbf{p} (if at all) as a response against \mathbf{q} . Similarly, $d_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})$ is a measurement of the amount that b_i is better than \mathbf{q} (if at all) as a response against \mathbf{p} . When \mathbf{p}^* and \mathbf{q}^* are optimal, it follows that $c_i(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}^*) = 0$ for all i (can you see why?) so $p_i^* = p_i$ for all i . Similarly, $q_i^* = q_i$. Thus, $T(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}^*) = (\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{q}^*)$.

Turning to the *only if* portion of the proof, suppose that (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) is a fixed point. We need to show that (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) is optimal. We first show that there exists an i such that both $p_i > 0$ and $c_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = 0$. Since, by definition (in class, ask me about how convex combinations can be graphically depicted),

$$M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = \sum_{i=1}^m p_i M(a_i, \mathbf{q})$$

we conclude that $M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) < M(a_i, \mathbf{q})$ cannot be true for all i such that $p_i > 0$. To see this, we'll do a mini-proof within this proof. Suppose that, $\forall i$ such that $p_i > 0$, $M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) < M(a_i, \mathbf{q})$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) &= \sum_{i=1}^m p_i M(a_i, \mathbf{q}) \\ &> \sum_{i=1}^m p_i M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) \\ &= M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) \sum_{i=1}^m p_i \\ &= M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}). \end{aligned}$$

This is a contradiction, so there for at least one $p_i > 0$ it must follow that $M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) \geq M(a_i, \mathbf{q})$. This ends our mini-proof. We will now use this to show that fixed points are optimal points.

But this implies that, for this i , $0 \geq M(a_i, \mathbf{q}) - M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})$ so, by definition of c_k , $c_i(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = 0$ for this i . For this i , the fact that (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) is a fixed point implies that

$$p_i = \frac{p_i + 0}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^m c_k(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})}.$$

Since $p_i > 0$ for this i , it follows that $\sum_{k=1}^m c_k(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = 0$. But the terms c_k are all non-negative (by definition), so they must all equal 0. This, in turn, means that $M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) \geq M(a_i, \mathbf{q})$ for all a_i . Since this is true regardless of \mathbf{q} , it follows that no other pure or mixed strategy has higher payoff for all \mathbf{q} . Thus, $M(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) \geq M(\mathbf{p}', \mathbf{q})$ for all \mathbf{p}' and for all \mathbf{q} so \mathbf{p} is good against all \mathbf{q} .

Similarly, we can show that \mathbf{q} is good against all \mathbf{p} , so when (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) is a fixed point of the transformation T then it is also optimal.

The only thing we have to do now to complete the proof is show that the transformation T has a fixed point. This existence follows from the Brouwer fixed-point theorem. We won't show how the fixed point theorem applies, but you might want to think about it a little bit. I'll paraphrase Luce and Raiffa's statement of the theorem. The theorem says that *any continuous transformation that maps a point of a spheroid (or something topologically "close" to a spheroid) in a finite dimensional Euclidean space into another point of the spheroid has at least one fixed point*. The space $P \times Q$ is topologically "close" to a spheroid and our transformation is continuous, so we know that a fixed point exists. Any optimal point is a fixed point, and any fixed point is an optimal point so we know that every zero-sum, two-player game has a mixed strategy equilibrium point.

Yippee! We did it.

References

- [1] R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa. *Games and Decisions*. John Wiley, New York, 1957.